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Abstract. Web services are an important series of industry standards
for adding semantics to web-based and XML-based communication, in
particular among enterprises. Like the entire series, the security stan-
dards and proposals are highly modular. Combinations of several stan-
dards are put together for testing as interoperability scenarios, and these
scenarios are likely to evolve into industry best practices. In the terminol-
ogy of security research, the interoperability scenarios correspond to se-
curity protocols. Hence, it is desirable to analyze them for security. In this
paper, we analyze the security of the new Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario, the first scenario to combine security elements with elements
of another quality-of-service standard. We do this both symbolically and
cryptographically. The results of both analyses are positive. The dis-
cussion of actual cryptographic primitives of web services security is a
novelty of independent interest in this paper.
1 Introduction
Web services are a series of standards that add higher-layer semantics and quality
of service to web-based communication. They use XML as the basic format for
all exchanged content and SOAP as the basis for message exchanges [2]. In
principle, web services are independent of the underlying transport protocol; in
practice, as the name suggests, typical web protocols are commonly used. An
important principle of web services is modularity (see [3]). This principle was in
particular applied to the design of quality-of-service features like security and
message ordering. Thus, these features are addressed by a set of standards and
pre-standard proposals that can, at least syntactically, be combined in a highly
flexible way. It is well-known, however, that combinations of security elements
have to be treated with care as many combinations may not yield the properties
that one might expect. The equivalent of the classic notion of security protocols
in the web-services space is interoperability profiles or scenarios. While primarily
? An earlier version of this paper appeared in [1].
defined for interoperability testing, they are not unlikely to evolve into industry
best practices for common cases. At the same time, they are at the level of
concreteness where an analysis for well-known protocol security properties is
possible.
In this paper, we present the first such analysis for an interoperabil-
ity profile that combines features from the standards and proposals for se-
curity and another quality-of-service area, reliable messaging. It is the Se-
cure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario [4], which recently arose from the WS-
ReliableMessaging and WS-SecureConversation Composability Interop Work-
shop held in April 2005.1 It is based on the WS-Security standard [5]
and the recent standard proposals WS-ReliableMessaging [6] and WS-
SecureConversation [7] with a few additional references to WS-Trust [8] and
WS-Addressing [9].
We present two types of analysis:
1. an automated analysis based on a number of symbolic protocol analysis
techniques under the assumption of perfect cryptography, and
2. an analysis closer to real cryptography based on explicit cryptographic as-
sumptions on the underlying cryptographic algorithms used.
Both analyses refer to the properties that are already informally stated in WS-
ReliableMessaging [6], where they are pointed out as desirable security properties
in the context of reliable sending of messages. WS-ReliableMessaging does not
address how these properties can be achieved but refers to a suitable combination
with the techniques offered by the security-specific web services standards. The
Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario provides such a combination, and our
analysis exemplifies that the properties can indeed be achieved by the techniques
offered by existing web services standards.
Our first, symbolic analysis has been carried out by employing the AVISPA
Tool [10, 11], which is a push-button tool for the analysis of security-sensitive
protocols and applications, under the assumption of perfect cryptography. The
AVISPA Tool relies on a modular and expressive formal language for specifying
protocols and their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that
implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. For our
analysis, we have employed OFMC [12] and CL-AtSe [13], which are the two
more mature back-ends of the tool and which both perform protocol falsification
and bounded verification by employing a number of symbolic techniques.
The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario has a structure that is far more
complex than standard security protocols. Hence, an important part of modeling
the protocol in a way feasible for automated analysis has been the search for a
way to restrict the number of permissible interleavings of sending and receiv-
ing events without excluding attacks, i.e., every attack on the original protocol
should be possible also on the simplified version. Below, we will first explain
how we have built such a specification, and then illustrate the goals that we
1 The title of [4] contains “scenarios” in the plural, but for our purposes the document
defines one protocol and we thus use the singular.
have checked in our analysis. Roughly speaking, we have shown that a client
and a service mutually authenticate each other on certain messages that they
exchange when executing the protocol, and that these messages remain secret.
These problems give rise to an infinite search space, so that automated tools
need to make restrictions on some aspects of the problem in order to analyze
it. We have considered different settings by imposing bounds on the number of
possible parallel protocol sessions, on the number of message sequences that can
be considered in each session, and on the number of payloads per message se-
quence. Neither OFMC nor CL-AtSe have reported any attacks for the settings
we considered, and they have thus verified the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario with respect to the modeled security properties for these settings.
Our second analysis is manual (and thus more time-consuming, less flexi-
ble to protocol additions, and more prone to human error), but more realistic
with respect to the cryptographic primitives. For instance, we show that we can
treat the occurring key derivation via hash functions in the standard model of
cryptography as pseudo-random functions if applied to certain pairs of argu-
ments. For the other primitives, symmetric and asymmetric encryption as well
as symmetric authentication and signatures, we can use standard definitions.
We also discuss how close existing theorems on justifying symbolic analyses
such as our first one come to replacing a from-scratch cryptographic analysis
such as our second one. Note, however, that the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario, like all other current communication security standards, does not pre-
scribe that provably secure primitives in the cryptographic sense are used, in
particular for the symmetric primitives. Thus, we cannot claim that we proved
exactly the standard implementations under what became known as standard
cryptographic assumptions such as the hardness of factoring. Our cryptographic
analysis is modular, and some results can immediately be reused for other pro-
files, e.g., the analysis of the initial key exchange based mainly on WS-Trust and
that of the key derivation using elements of WS-SecureConversation.
Both our analyses have positive results, i.e., they demonstrate that at the
abstraction level of each analysis, the protocol is error-free. Note that our two
analyses are complementary (in particular, neither of them is derived from the
other), but we consider it interesting future work to investigate how to link the
two kinds of analysis for web services in the style of previous proofs of sound-
ness of Dolev-Yao models, e.g., see [14–22] for generic computational soundness
results, [23–26, 1, 27] for their use for the computationally sound analysis of se-
curity protocols, and [28–31, 28, 32, 33] for the sound preservation of individual
security properties such as integrity, liveness, or non-interference.
Outline of the Paper. We start by describing the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario and the corresponding security properties in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4
contain the symbolic and the cryptographic analysis of the scenario, respectively.
After reviewing further related work in Section 5, we give concluding remarks
and discuss possible future extensions of this work in Section 6. Appendices A,
B, C and D contain detailed technical explanations and proofs.
Long-term keys:
pkeX , skeX Public and secret encryption key of X ∈ {C, S}.
pksX , sksX Public and secret signature key of X ∈ {C, S}.
pksCA Public signature key of a certification authority CA.
CertX Public key certificate of X ∈ {C, S}. We have CertX = X, pkeX , pksX ,
SigCA(X, pkeX , pksX), where SigCA(·) denotes a signature computed by the
certification authority CA, valid with respect to pksCA.
Cryptographic primitives:
EncX(·) A public-key encryption scheme, denoting encryptions computed with public
key pkeX for X ∈ {C, S}.
SigX(·) A digital signature scheme, denoting signatures computed with secret key
sksX for X ∈ {C, S}.
SymEnck (·) A symmetric encryption scheme, denoting encryptions computed with secret
key k .
Mack (·) A message authentication code, denoting MACs computed with secret key k .
Hash(·) A hash function, e.g., SHA-256.
Fig. 1. Keys and cryptographic algorithms used in the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario.
2 The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario
The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario is a two-party protocol initiated by
a client C and run together with a service S. It consists of three phases starting
with a key-exchange phase, followed by the message-sending phase which uses
this key, and finished by a termination phase which cancels the validity of the
exchanged keys.
We will use a straight font to denote cryptographic algorithms (Enc, Sig,
etc.), a straight font with capital letters to denote protocol-specific constants
(RST, RSTR, etc.), and an italic font to denote keys, identities, etc.
The key-exchange phase is based on public-key cryptography and hence re-
quires a mechanism to authenticate the respective public keys. The profile as-
sumes a certification authority CA, which has a secret key sksCA. Its public
counterpart, pksCA, is known to both C and S. The certification authority cer-
tifies the public keys of party X ∈ {C, S} by signing the triple (X, pkeX , pksX)
with its key sksCA, where pkeX and pksX denote X’s public encryption key and
X’s signature verification key, respectively. Note that pksCA must have been
conveyed in an authenticated manner to both C and S, and that pksCA must
not give certificates with the name X of an honest party to any other party.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the notation for the keys held by both parties,
the cryptographic primitives we will be using, and the quantities involved in the
protocol. For interoperability, the scenario uses specific cryptographic algorithms
to implement the respective primitives — RSA-1.5 for public-key encryption,
Quantities occurring in the protocols:
ID1, . . . , ID9 Message IDs of the individual protocol messages.
IDsk ID of the symmetric master key sk that is established in the initial key
exchange phase.
IDSeq Sequence ID denoting the sequence of exchanged messages.
N,N∗ Nonces used to compute the master key sk .
N1, N2 Nonces used to compute the authentication and encryption session keys
sk1 and sk2.
m Payload that should be reliably sent from C to S.
n Natural number denoting an acknowledged message.
k , k ′ Symmetric keys used within a hybrid encryption in the initial key exchange
phase.
sk Symmetric master key shared between C and S after the initial key ex-
change phase. Derived from N and N∗ as sk = Hash(N,N∗).
sk1, sk2 Symmetric session keys for authentication and encryption shared between
C and S after the start of the message sending. Derived from sk , N1, and
N2 as sk i = Hash(Ni, sk).
Fig. 2. Quantities used in the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario.
RSA-SHA1 for digital signatures, AES128-CBC for symmetric encryption, and
HMAC-SHA1 for message authentication codes. In the cryptographic analysis
that we carry out in Section 4, we do not fix specific algorithms but require
that the used algorithms satisfy the respective security definitions under active
attacks, e.g., indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in
the case of public-key encryption. Efficient schemes that satisfy these definitions
exist under reasonable assumptions.
2.1 Description of the Protocol
Before the protocol begins, each partyX ∈ {C, S} has some starting information.
Besides its own encryption and signature keys, the client starts with the signature
verification key pksCA of the certification authority CA, a certificate CertC of
its own public keys, and a certificate CertS of the public keys of the service. The
service starts only with the signature verification key pksCA and with its own
encryption and signature keys.
The protocol consists of nine steps, which we now briefly describe; an illus-
trative prose description of the individual protocol steps based on Figures 3-5
is given in Appendix A. The first two steps constitute the key-exchange phase
of the protocol between the client and the service and essentially rely on the
functionalities offered by WS-SecureConversation; they are depicted in Figure 3.
Similarly, the last two steps cancel the validity of this key as depicted in Figure 5.
Steps three to seven are depicted in Figure 4 and constitute the message-sending
phase, which consists of the creation of a message sequence, the secure sending
of a message m, and the closing of the sequence; each of these steps essentially
relies on the functionalities offered by WS-ReliableMessaging.
Composite Fields for Initial Key Exchange (Step 1-2):
body1 SymEnck(RST, S,N)
SigConf SigC(ID1, S,RST, C, body1,CertC)
header1 EncS(k), SymEnck(SigConf )
body2 SymEnck′(RSTR, IDsk , S,N
∗)
header2 EncC(k
′), SymEnck′(SigConf ),
SymEnck′(SigS(ID2, C,RSTR, ID1,SigConf , body2))
Protocol Flows (Step 1-2, from WS-SecureConversation):
1. RequestSecurityToken: C −−
ID1, S,RST, C,CertC , header1, body1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
2. RequestSecurityTokenResponse: C ←−
ID2, C,RSTR, ID1,CertC , header2, body2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S
Fig. 3. The Key-exchange Phase, implemented via WS-SecureConversation.
The protocol is not simply a ping-pong protocol: after the key-exchange phase
has been completed, the client is allowed to start multiple sessions of the message-
sending phase in parallel and there are non-deterministic choices on the order of
messages.
The necessary tests on the received messages follow the usual convention as
described in [34], e.g., an honest receiver of a message checks that the decrypted
plaintexts are of the correct format, that respective parts of the plaintext match
corresponding parts sent unencrypted in the same message, and that the sender
and receiver fields contain the expected values. We do not always mention this
explicitly in the following.
Possible Protocol Extensions. We moreover sketch a possible extension of the
interoperability scenario to reflect additional capabilities of the client and the
service offered by the WS-ReliableMessaging standard. The standard addition-
ally allows a client to request an unreceived acknowledgment of a previously sent
message, and it allows a service to ask the client to re-send a message if it has
not been received yet. This yields two additional steps which are depicted in
Figure 6. Their prose description is given in Appendix A.
2.2 Security Properties
We consider a range of reasonable security requirements for the parties involved;
some of the requirements are explicitly mandated by the standards, others are
optional and hold only under stronger assumptions on the underlying crypto-
graphic primitives. The following security properties are explicitly pointed out
in WS-ReliableMessaging:
– No Message Alteration: Payloads contained in the 5. PayloadMessage in a
session between an honest client and an honest service cannot be altered by
an adversary.
Composite Fields for Message Sending (Step 3-7):
Session (IDsk , N2), (IDsk , N1)
body3 CS, C, IDsk
header3 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID3, S,CS, C, body3))
body4 CSR, IDSeq
header4 SymEncsk2(SigConf ),SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID4, C,CSR, ID3, body4))
body5 SymEncsk2(PM,m)
header5 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID5, S,PM, (IDSeq ,n), body5))
body6 ()
header6 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID6, C, SA, (IDSeq ,n), body6))
body7 TS, IDSeq
header7 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID7, S,TS, (TS, IDSeq), body7))
Message Sending (Step 3-7, from WS-ReliableMessaging):
3. CreateSequence: C −−−−−
ID3, S,CS,Session, header3, body3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
4. CreateSequenceResponse: C ←−−−−
ID4, C,CSR,Session, header4, body4−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S
5. PayloadMessage: C −−−−−−−
ID5,S,PM,(IDSeq ,n),IDsk ,Session,
header5,body5−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
6. SequenceAcknowledgment: C ←−
ID6, C, SA, (IDSeq ,n),Session, header6, body6−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S
7. TerminateSequence: C −−−
ID7, S,TS, IDsk ,Session, header7, body7−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
Fig. 4. The Message-sending Phase, implemented via WS-ReliableMessaging.
– No Message Disclosure: Payloads contained in the 5. PayloadMessage in a
session between an honest client and an honest service remain secret from
the adversary.
– Key Integrity and Confidentiality : If an honest client and an honest service
established a shared key sk after the first two steps of the protocol, both
parties obtained the same key. Moreover, this key is secret from the adver-
sary.
– Authentication: If an honest service accepts a payload m presumably from
an honest client, then this honest client indeed sent this payload in the same
session.
Accountability is also mentioned in WS-ReliableMessaging as one of the proper-
ties desirable in certain scenarios. As this scenario uses symmetric cryptography
for the message authentication, accountability in the sense of non-repudiation is
clearly not a goal of this scenario. The potential real-life accountability of this
scenario is formally captured on the protocol level by the message integrity prop-
erty and otherwise given by non-protocol factors. We refer to Appendix C for
additional useful properties that are not explicitly required by the standard as
Composite Fields for Session Closure (Step 8-9):
Session (IDsk , N2), (IDsk , N1)
body8 CST, IDsk
header8 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID8, S,CST, C, body8)
body9 CSTR
header9 SymEncsk2(SigConf ),
SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID9, C,CSTR, (IDsk , N1), body9)
Protocol Flows (Step 8-9, from WS-SecureConversation):
8. CancelSecurityToken: C −
ID8, S,CST, C, IDsk ,Session, header8, body8−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
9. CancelSecurityTokenResp: C ←−−−
ID9, C,CSTR,Session, header9, body9−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S
Fig. 5. The Termination Phase, implemented via WS-SecureConversation.
well as for a refinement of the aforementioned properties tailored to the Secure
WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario.
3 Symbolic Security Analysis
The AVISPA Tool. We have carried out a symbolic analysis of the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario by employing the AVISPA Tool [10, 11], which is a
push-button tool for the automated validation, under the assumption of perfect
cryptography and Dolev-Yao adversary [35], of industrial-scale Internet security-
sensitive protocols and applications. A user interacts with the AVISPA Tool
by specifying a security problem (a protocol paired with a security property
that it is expected to achieve) in the High-Level Protocol Specification Language
HLPSL [36], which is an expressive, modular, role-based, formal language that
allows for the specification of control-flow patterns, data structures, alternative
adversary models, complex security properties, as well as different cryptographic
operators and their algebraic properties. The AVISPA Tool automatically trans-
lates a user-defined security problem into an equivalent description of an infinite-
state transition system that is then input to the back-ends of the AVISPA Tool.
The back-ends search the transition system for states that represent attacks on
the intended properties of the protocol.
The current version [10, 11] of the tool integrates four back-ends that im-
plement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques, ranging
from protocol falsification (by finding an attack on the input protocol) to
abstraction-based verification methods for infinite numbers of sessions. The back-
ends are: the On-the-fly Model-Checker OFMC, the Constraint-Logic-based At-
tack Searcher CL-AtSe, the SAT-based Model-Checker SATMC, and the TA4SP
verifier, which analyzes protocols by implementing tree automata based on au-
Composite Fields for Protocol Extension:
ID5.1, ID5.1∗ Message IDs of the additional protocol messages.
body5.1 ()
header5.1 SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID5.1, C,NAck, (IDSeq ,n), body5.1))
body5.1∗ ()
header5.1∗ SymEncsk2(Macsk1(ID5.1∗ , C,AR, (IDSeq ,n), body5.1∗))
Resend and Ack Inquiries (Between Step 5 and 6, from WS-
ReliableMessaging):
5.1. NotAcknowledged: C ←−
ID5.1, C,NAck, (IDSeq ,n),Session, header5.1, body5.1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S
5.1∗. AckRequested: C −
ID5.1∗ , C,AR, (IDSeq ,n),Session, header5.1∗ , body5.1∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S
Fig. 6. Extension of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario with Resend Inquiries.
tomatic approximations. All the back-ends of the tool analyze protocols by con-
sidering the standard Dolev-Yao model of an active adversary that controls the
network but cannot break cryptography; in particular, the adversary can inter-
cept messages and analyze them if it possesses the respective keys for decryp-
tion, and it can generate messages from his knowledge and send them under any
party’s name. Upon termination, the AVISPA Tool outputs that the protocol
was verified with respect to the specified security problem, that an attack was
found, or that the available resources were exhausted.
For our analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario, we have em-
ployed OFMC [12] and CL-AtSe [13], which are the two more mature back-ends
of the tool, with better scope and performance. OFMC and CL-AtSe both per-
form protocol falsification and bounded verification by employing a number of
symbolic techniques. Some of these techniques are back-end specific, while other
ones are common to the two back-ends, such as the lazy intruder technique to
symbolically represent all the possible messages that the Dolev-Yao adversary
can generate. These techniques enable both OFMC and CL-AtSe to handle pro-
tocols with complex message terms and in particular to model the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario in its full complexity, without having to simplify the
messages that are exchanged.2
The Model. The back-ends of the AVISPA Tool have successfully validated (or
found a number of new attacks on) security protocols such as those in the
Clark/Jacob library [37], as well as Kerberos, IKE, SET, and other protocols
proposed by standardization organizations such as the IETF, ITU, W3C, Oa-
2 The complexity of the Scenario prevents the usage of the current versions of SATMC
and TA4SP. We hope to soon be able to report on the analysis with these back-ends
as well; in particular, if analysis with TA4SP succeeded, then that would prove that
the protocol is safe for secrecy goals for any number of sessions.
sis, IEEE, 3GPP, and OMA. Similar analyses have been carried out by other
(semi-)automated tools such as [38–42].
The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario has a structure that is far more
complex than that of standard security protocols. Nonetheless, thanks to its ex-
pressiveness, HLPSL allows us to completely model the protocol, i.e., to provide
a formal specification of the complex interactions between the two honest parties,
which we can model as two separate client and service programs that commu-
nicate over an insecure network controlled by a Dolev-Yao adversary. However,
such a model is too complex for automated analysis as even for a limited number
of sessions, the set of permissible interleavings of sending and receiving events
is enormous. For instance, the messages sent by the client may arrive in any
order at the service. Additionally, both the client and the service can send “ad-
ministrative” messages, i.e., acknowledge messages, request the retransmission
of messages, or request the acknowledgment of messages. An important part of
modeling the protocol in a way feasible for automated analysis has thus been
the search for a way to restrict the number of interleavings without excluding
attacks, i.e., such that any attack on the original protocol is possible also on the
simplified version.
We have performed a step-by-step simplification of the client and service
programs, whereby we have showed that these simplifications do not exclude
any attacks.3 As we lack space to give the HLPSL specification here due to its
complexity and the amount of explanation that would be necessary, we only
sketch the main ideas behind our HLPSL specification. In particular, we briefly
illustrate the simplifications we have carried out for the client program; the ones
for the service program are similar, and more details can be found in Appendix B,
together with a formal justification of the fact that these simplifications of the
HLPSL specification do not exclude any attacks.
In order to simplify the client, note, firstly, that it is not a restric-
tion if the client sends in one transition all the messages that it wishes
to transmit via the 5. PayloadMessage step as soon as it has received the
4. CreateSequenceResponse message. Secondly, the client can neglect any re-
quests of step 5.1. NotAcknowledged from the service to retransmit messages,
since the Dolev-Yao adversary has seen all messages and can thus replay them
to the service if this is necessary for an attack. Hence, we can consider a sim-
plified client program that, having sent all its payload messages, simply waits
for acknowledgment messages (6. SequenceAcknowledgment) or, after timing out,
requests acknowledgment from the service (5.1∗. AckRequested). Thirdly, since
the Dolev-Yao adversary can intercept all responses from the service, it might
deliberately make the client produce acknowledge request messages. Hence we
can assume that the adversary can obtain 5.1∗. AckRequested messages for every
3 The simplified (restricted) version of the protocol that we obtain in this way is only
useful for the formal analysis, not for the practical deployment of the protocol: for
instance, since a Dolev-Yao adversary can replay old messages arbitrarily if this is
necessary to mount an attack, we can restrict the model to client programs that
never retransmit old messages.
payload message. No attacks are therefore excluded if the client program sends
with every 5. PayloadMessage also an 5.1∗. AckRequested message.
These simplifications yield a client program that behaves as follows in every
message sending phase: it sends all payload messages together with the corre-
sponding requests for acknowledgment in one step, then waits until all messages
are acknowledged, and finally sends a 7. TerminateSequence message.
Goals. Let us define the security-relevant messages of the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario to be the key-material (sk, sk1, and sk2) and all
payloads transmitted with a 5. PayloadMessage. For our symbolic analysis, we
have specified a number of secrecy and authentication goals (giving rise to dif-
ferent HLPSL security problems for the Scenario):
– secrecy of all security-relevant messages, and
– mutual authentication between client and service on all security-relevant
messages.
We model these goals by labeling several transitions in the HLPSL specification
with special events that express the meaning of the transition with respect to
the goals of the protocol. First, whenever a client c that believes to talk with
service s creates a security-relevant message m, then it generates a secret event
secret(m,{c,s}) expressing that m must remain secret between the parties in
the specified set, in this case c and s. This allows us to define a violation of
secrecy by a state of the transition system in which the adversary knows a mes-
sage m for which a secrecy event has occurred with a set of parties to which the
adversary does not belong. Second, we define violations of authentication by la-
beling the transitions with witness and request events. Whenever a party a that
believes to talk with another party b first “handles” some security-relevant mes-
sage m (i.e., either creates it or receives it for the first time), then it generates an
event witness(a,b,id,m) where id is an identifier that uniquely determines the
purpose of the message in the protocol. This witness event expresses that a uses
message m for communication with b and for purpose id. The service s generates
an event request(s,c,id,m) when it receives a payload m (supposedly) from
the client c with index id. Similarly, if the client c receives the acknowledgement
for the id-th payload (supposedly) from the service s, and if c has previously
sent m as the id-th payload, then c generates the event request(c,s,id,m).
Similar request events are generated for the authentication on the key-material.
(Intuitively, request events express that a party begins to rely on the agreement
with another party on the specified value.)
A violation of authentication is then defined as any of the two follow-
ing situations. First, weak authentication is violated whenever there is a
request(b,a,id,m) but no matching witness event witness(a,b,id,m), i.e.,
a party b believes a message m to come from a, but a has never sent m, at least
not for this purpose. Second, strong authentication is violated whenever weak
authentication is, or whenever a request event occurs more frequently than the
corresponding witness event (i.e., by a kind of replay, the adversary made party
b accept a message more often than it was actually said by a). Note that these
goals are equivalent to Lowe’s [43] notions of non-injective and injective agree-
ment, respectively.
The security problems that we obtain by modeling these goals cover the
main security properties stated for the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario
in Section 2.2 as follows:
– secrecy of all security-relevant messages covers no message disclosure and
key confidentiality,
– mutual authentication between client and service on all security-relevant
messages covers no message alteration, key integrity, and authentication.
Bounds of the Analysis. The security problems associated with the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario give rise to an infinite search space, so that, in order
to analyze this space, automated tools need to make some restrictions, i.e., to
impose some bounds to consider relevant protocol execution and analysis set-
tings. In the following, we will describe the restrictions that we imposed in our
analysis with OFMC and CL-AtSe.
In general, there is no bound on the number of parties and sessions of the
protocol that can be executed in parallel. While one can bound the number
of parties, by the argumentations of [44] or by the symbolic sessions technique
of OFMC [12], the problem of an unbounded number of sessions cannot be
solved in general since it gives rise to undecidability. Moreover, there are two
similar problems of unboundedness in the protocol: there is no bound on the
number of payload messages to be exchanged or on the number of new message
sequences that can be started, i.e., the protocol contains unbounded loops. All
these problems give rise to an unbounded number of steps of honest parties,
while both OFMC and CL-AtSe currently require analysis settings with bounded
numbers of steps of honest parties.
In general, there is also no bound on the complexity of messages that the ad-
versary can generate. However, as we remarked above, both OFMC and CL-AtSe
implement the lazy intruder technique, which uses a symbolic representation to
avoid explicitly enumerating the possible messages that the Dolev-Yao adversary
can generate, and which allows for an analysis without restricting this parameter
of the problem.
We have therefore analyzed the protocol with OFMC and CL-AtSe under the
following execution/analysis settings: there are at most three parallel protocol
sessions, the client can start at most two message-sending sequences per protocol
session, and there are at most three payload messages per message sequence.
Neither OFMC nor CL-AtSe have reported any attacks on the protocol for these
analysis settings. In particular, for three parallel sessions, both OFMC and CL-
AtSe verified the protocol within three hours (while the verification of smaller
settings required between few seconds to a minute).
4 Cryptographic Security Analysis
In this section, we complement the symbolic analysis of the security properties
of the WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario from Section 3 by a cryptographic analy-
sis. Thus we now analyze the security of the scenario in a cryptographic setting
where the cryptographic primitives and the perfect cryptography assumption
are replaced with actual cryptographic algorithms and the corresponding se-
curity notions that reason about probabilistic polynomial-time attackers. It is
known that, even if the symbolic analysis is careful in distinguishing primitives
like symmetric encryption and authentication, as both the analyzed scenario and
the analysis in Section 3 do, and even if one assumes that an implementation
is made with primitives secure according to the strictest usual cryptographic
definitions, the results of such a symbolic analysis may not carry over to the real
implementation. The most prominent example is that it cannot be avoided in
general that the length of encrypted payload data, such as the values m in the
PayloadMessage, leaks. Other problems that may occur in general scenarios are
due to the probabilism of secure public-key encryption, key-stealing attacks, and
manipulations of symmetric encryptions unless authenticated encryption [45, 46]
is used in the implementation [15, 47]. Consequently, in a Dolev-Yao-style crypto-
graphic library designed to be implemented based on arbitrary cryptographically
secure primitives and to be usable in a secure way within arbitrary protocols
with arbitrary security properties, both the abstraction and the realization must
have certain idiosyncrasies. Hence, while it might be interesting to augment a
tool like the AVISPA Tool by the idiosyncrasies of the Dolev-Yao style model
of [15, 16, 47, 48], and while implementing the primitives of WS-Security with
the extended realizations from those papers (e.g., some additional tagging and
randomization) might realize the goal of web service security to offer completely
composable primitives also in a semantic sense, neither has been done yet. Other
work on bridging the gap between symbolic and cryptographic security concen-
trated more on keeping very close to standard symbolic and real versions at the
cost of generality. However, at present none of them covers the protocol class of
Secure WS-ReliableMessaging, nor the security properties required. The seminal
work [14] treats passive attacks only. Active attacks have been considered in this
context in [20, 49, 19]. First, however, each of these papers treats only one cryp-
tographic primitive, asymmetric encryption in [20, 19] and symmetric encryption
in [49]. Secondly, [20] only treats integrity properties, while [49] only treats the
secrecy of fixed, protocol-internal messages and [19] only treats the secrecy of
nonces, i.e., random values chosen within the protocol and not usable for opera-
tions (such as encrypting) in that protocol. Since computational soundness has
become a highly active line of research, we exemplarily list further recent results
in this area without going into further details [50–53].4 It may be interesting
future work to extend such results on restricted usage of cryptographic libraries
to the typical usage in WS-Security protocols. Our following considerations can
be seen as a step in this direction.
4 There is also work on formulating syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and
polynomial-time considerations and encoding them into proof tools, in particular [54–
57]. This is orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models, which offer a
higher level of abstraction and thus much simpler proofs where applicable, so that
proofs of larger systems can be automated.
Given these shortcomings of the current methods for deducing the security
in the cryptographic setting from a symbolic proof, we do not try to do that,
but base our proof directly on existing cryptographic work that explored the
security of encryption, signatures, and MACs when combined in specific ways.
In the following, we assume that the public-key encryption system Enc be secure
against adaptive-chosen ciphertext attacks (short IND-CCA2-secure), that the
symmetric encryption scheme be secure under adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks
(short IND-CPA-secure), and that the signature scheme Sig and the message
authentication scheme Mac be secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
(short IND-CMA-secure). These are the commonly accepted security definitions
of these primitives under active attacks so that we omit their rigorous definition.
Primitives secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions.
Furthermore, we have to require that the hash function Hash used to compute
the secret key sk based on two secret nonces does not degenerate the randomness
induced by the nonces. This would be clear if we worked in the random oracle
model; however, the specific setting of the scenario allows us to work in the
standard model with a sufficient condition being that Hash, when applied to
pairs, is a pseudo-random function in its first argument.
We obtain the following theorem (whose proof is postponed to Appendix D
for the sake of space), in which we assume that the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario is run as a stand-alone protocol. This is not necessarily realistic for a
web-services implementation; then our approach may have to take policies into
account as in [58].
Theorem 1. (Cryptographic Security of Secure WS-Reliable Messaging Sce-
nario) If Enc is IND-CCA2-secure, if Sig is IND-CMA-secure, if SymEnc is IND-
CPA-secure, and if Hash, when applied to pairs, is a pseudo-random function
in its first argument, then key integrity and key confidentiality are cryptograph-
ically fulfilled for the scenario, i.e., if the protocol is run with a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary, the keys are authentic with overwhelming probabil-
ity, and the keys are indistinguishable from fresh random keys given the view
of the adversary. If additionally Mac is IND-CMA-secure,then message integrity
and no message disclosure as well as all optional properties listed in Appendix C
are cryptographically fulfilled. 2
5 Further Related Literature
Work is currently underway on scaling-up formal analysis methods and tools to
web services security protocols, e.g., [59, 60, 58, 61, 62], although none of these
works performs a cryptographic analysis of the protocols. In particular, the
TulaFale tool [61] compiles descriptions of XML/SOAP-based security proto-
cols and properties into the applied pi calculus and then employs the ProVerif
tool [39]. We considered employing also TulaFale for the automatic symbolic
analysis of Secure WS-ReliableMessaging, but its input language would first
need to be extended to express all the constructs of the profile, and we thus
leave this analysis and the comparison with our own symbolic analysis as future
work. Recent work has also considered the automated analysis of XML-based
web services: [63] presents a formal analysis of an encoding of the original XML
messages into standard security protocol notation, showing that this encoding
is without loss of attacks. Based on this encoding, the Casper/FDR tool can
then check security properties for an unbounded number of sessions thanks to
the employed data independence technique (which is similar to the abstraction
techniques in TA4SP). The considered protocol, however, is simpler than the Se-
cure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario (e.g., no open-ended exchange of payload
messages) and its analysis with Casper/FDR required simplifications of the mes-
sage terms. It is thus not clear if the method of [63] could also work on complex
protocols such as the one considered in this paper.
Another type of analysis of a web services security protocol is that of an
interoperability profile of WS-Federation in [64]. The analyzed profile [65] is a
passive requestor profile, i.e., the user is represented only by a browser. The
emphasis therefore lies on treating a browser in a protocol security proof. The
analysis is by hand, and as only signatures and secure channels occur as cryp-
tographic primitives, there is not much discussion of detailed properties of the
cryptographic primitives in web services.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
We have given a symbolic and a cryptographic analysis of the security of the new
Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario, which constitutes the first web services
scenario to combine security elements with elements of another quality-of-service
standard. The results of both analyses are positive, i.e., they are proofs as far
as the techniques faithfully represent the standards; these restrictions concern
the cryptographic primitives and, in the symbolic case, the analysis settings.
Our symbolic analysis is a further step in the use of formal proof tools for the
validation of security protocols and web services under the perfect cryptography
assumption. Our cryptographic analysis constitutes an important first step to
reason about the security of web services in the more realistic setting where
the perfect cryptography assumption is replaced by the complexity-theoretic
definitions of cryptography. Some of the cryptographic results are of more general
applicability in web services security than for the specific settings analyzed here.
As future work on the symbolic side, we have begun considering additional
symbolic analysis settings, as well as employing abstraction techniques for carry-
ing out unbounded verification. To this end, it would be particularly interesting
not only to employ AVISPA’s TA4SP, but also to investigate the relationships
and possible complementarity of our analysis with an analysis carried out by
TulaFale/ProVerif, especially since the model checkers that we used implement
different techniques than those of ProVerif (which combines symbolic represen-
tations based on first-order logic and abstractions). Moreover, it would be of
great help to be able to exploit the automatic compilation provided by TulaFale
and we will thus investigate how to do so for the AVISPA Tool. We believe that
the work of [66] will be helpful here, as it provides a preliminary translation
procedure from protocol descriptions in HLPSL to descriptions in the applied
pi calculus, which thus allows one to apply the ProVerif tool to some existing
HLPSL protocol specifications.
On the cryptographic side, it would be interesting to see in which respect one
can weaken the security requirements imposed on the cryptographic primitives
without invalidating the security properties. Furthermore, we intend to apply our
techniques to other profiles and scenarios and possibly even to a policy-based
analysis similar to [58] on the symbolic side.
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A Illustrative Description of the Individual Protocol
Steps
In this section, we provide a flow-by-flow description of the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario, based on Figure 3-5 for the steps of the original
protocol, and based on Figure 6 for the auxiliary protocol steps.
A.1 Steps of the Original Protocol
1. RequestSecurityToken : The client first generates a fresh symmetric encryp-
tion key k and a fresh nonce N and computes body1 = SymEnck(RST, S,N). It
then computes a signature SigConf over (ID1, S,RST, C, body1,CertC) using its
key sksC . (The name SigConf reflects that this signature is called a signature
confirmation in the scenario description since the service will include this sig-
nature in a subsequent protocol step to confirm that it successfully received the
signature.) The client then computes header1 = EncS(k),SymEnck(SigConf ),
where the key pkeS used to compute EncS is part of CertS , and sends the
1. RequestSecurityToken message.
2. RequestSecurityTokenResponse : The service decrypts EncS(k) yielding k, then
decrypts SymEnck(SigConf ) yielding SigConf . The service extracts CertC from
SigConf , validates that CertC is a valid certificate with respect to the public
key pksCA and verifies the validity of SigConf with respect to the verification
key pksC contained in CertC . The service then decrypts body1 and aborts if this
is not possible or the resulting cleartext is not of the correct format (RST, S,N).
The service then generates a fresh key k′ and a fresh nonce N∗, sets sk :=
Hash(N,N∗), and selects a unique key ID IDsk for sk . The service then computes
body2 and header2 as shown in the protocol description, where the encryption
EncC is computed with the public encryption key pkeC that is contained in the
certificate CertC , and sends the 2. RequestSecurityTokenResponse message.
3. CreateSequence : The client decrypts EncC(k
′) yielding k′. It then decrypts the
remaining encrypted message parts with respect to k′, checks if the plaintexts
are of the correct form, and checks if the new signature is valid with respect
to the public key pksS in the certificate CertS . If so, the client extracts the
nonce N∗ and the key identifier IDsk and computes the shared master key as
sk := Hash(N,N∗). The client may then open new message sequences using the
master key sk by first selecting two fresh nonces N1, N2 and by computing keys
sk i := Hash(Ni, sk) for i = 1, 2. The client then computes body3 and header3
according to the protocol description and sends the 3. CreateSequence message.
4. CreateSequenceResponse : The service answers the sequence creation by first
computing the keys sk i from sk and Session and by decrypting header3 with
key sk2 and by checking the validity of the contained message authentication
code with respect to sk1. If the code is over a message of the correct form, the
service computes body4 and header4 according to the protocol description and
sends the 4. CreateSequenceResponse message.
5. PayloadMessage : Once the client receives a response that the sequence has
been established, it can start to send payloads within that sequence. To uniquely
identify a sequence, the client first selects a unique IDSeq denoting the ID of
the sequence. The WS-ReliableMessaging standard mandates that payloads be
equipped with successive natural numbers. The client can send the first pay-
load m by constructing the message according to the protocol description with
n instantiated to 1. Honest clients are furthermore required to be consistent in
that they never send different payloads having the same sequence number, e.g.,
as a response to a message resend inquiry. In the original interoperability sce-
nario, this message is called PingMessage because for concrete testing, a concrete
payload, ping, was also chosen.
6. SequenceAcknowledgment : At any point in time after the service has sent the
4. CreateSequenceResponse message and before it receives a 7. TerminateSequence
message (cf. below), the service is allowed to acknowledge receipt of already
received payloads. This is modeled in the 6. SequenceAcknowledgment message.
Here n denotes either a single natural number denoting an acknowledgment
for the message with sequence number n, or a range of numbers indicating an
acknowledgment of all messages whose sequence number is within this range.
7. TerminateSequence : If the client has received acknowledgments for all
messages within a sequence, it terminates the sequence by sending the
7. TerminateSequence message to the service. This indicates to the service that
the transmission of the respective messages within the considered sequence has
been successfully completed.
8. CancelSecurityToken : After a sequence has been terminated, the client can
furthermore ask to cancel the validity of the master key sk , i.e., it sends a message
indicating to the service that the key sk and all its derivates should be no longer
considered for future sessions. This is modeled using the 8. CancelSecurityToken
message.
9. CancelSecurityTokenResponse : The service responds to the key cancellation by
sending a 9. CancelSecurityTokenResponse message, indicating that the previous
message has been successfully received and that the master key sk has been
revoked.
A.2 Steps of the Extension of the Protocol
5.1. NotAcknowledged : After the service received a 3. CreateSequence message
and before it receives a 7. TerminateSequence message, the service can ask the
client to re-send a message that it has not received yet. The corresponding mes-
sage closely resembles the 5. PayloadMessage where the number n denotes the
number of the message that should be re-sent. If a client receives a message of
that form, it re-sends the corresponding 5. PayloadMessage for the considered
number and message.
5.1∗. AckRequested : Similar to the previous flow, the client can request acknowl-
edgment for a message it previously sent to the service and for which it did not
get an acknowledgment. If the service receives such a request, it responds with
a 6. SequenceAcknowledgment message if the corresponding message has been
received, otherwise with a 5.1. NotAcknowledged message.
B More About the Symbolic Security Analysis
B.1 The AVISPA Tool.
The AVISPA Tool [10] is a push-button tool for the automated validation, un-
der the assumption of perfect cryptography, of industrial-scale Internet security-
sensitive protocols and applications. It provides a modular and expressive formal
language for specifying protocols and their security properties, and integrates dif-
ferent back-ends that implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis
techniques, ranging from protocol falsification (by finding an attack on the input
protocol) to abstraction-based verification methods for both finite and infinite
numbers of sessions.
More specifically, a user interacts with the AVISPA Tool by specifying a se-
curity problem (a protocol paired with a security property that it is expected to
achieve) in the High-Level Protocol Specification Language HLPSL [36], which is
an expressive, modular, role-based, formal language that allows for the specifica-
tion of control flow patterns, data structures, alternative adversary models, com-
plex security properties, as well as different cryptographic operators and their
algebraic properties. The AVISPA Tool automatically translates a user-defined
security problem into an equivalent specification written in the rewrite-based
formalism Intermediate Format IF. An IF specification describes an infinite-
state transition system amenable to formal analysis: this specification is input
to the back-ends of the AVISPA Tool, which implement a variety of techniques to
search the corresponding infinite-state transition system for states that represent
attacks on the intended properties of the protocol.
As we remarked above, for our analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging
Scenario, we have employed the back-ends OFMC [12] and CL-AtSe [13], which
employ a number of automated reasoning and simplification techniques that
enable them to handle protocols with complex message terms and in particular to
model the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario in its full complexity, without
simplification of the messages that are exchanged. Although the complexity of
the Scenario prevents the usage of the back-ends SATMC and TA4SP, we hope to
soon be able to report on the analysis with these back-ends as well. In particular,
if analysis with TA4SP succeeded, then that would prove that the protocol is
safe for secrecy goals for any number of sessions (by over-approximation).
B.2 The Model.
The Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario has a structure that is far more com-
plex than standard security protocols. Nonetheless, thanks to its expressiveness,
HLPSL allows us to completely model the protocol, i.e., to provide a formal
specification of the complex interactions between the two honest parties, which
we can model as two separate client and service programs that communicate
over an insecure network controlled by a Dolev-Yao adversary.
However, such a model is too complex for automated analysis as even for a
limited number of sessions, the set of permissible interleavings of sending and
receiving events is enormous. For instance, the messages sent by the client may
arrive in any order at the service. Additionally, both the client and the ser-
vice can send “administrative” messages, i.e., acknowledge messages, request
the retransmission of messages, or request the acknowledgment of messages. An
important part of modeling the protocol in a way feasible for automated anal-
ysis has thus been the search for a way to restrict the number of interleavings
without excluding attacks, i.e., such that any attack on the original protocol is
possible also on the simplified version.
Below, we will perform a step-by-step simplification of the client and service
programs, and we will argue that these simplifications do not exclude any attacks.
Note that the simplified (restricted) version of the protocol that we obtain in
this way is only useful for the formal analysis, not for the practical deployment of
the protocol: for instance, since a Dolev-Yao adversary can replay old messages
arbitrarily if this is necessary to mount an attack, we can restrict the model to
client programs that never retransmit old messages.
Such simplifications are not restrictions, but may be slight over-
approximations of the situations that can occur. In general, it can happen that
such an over-approximation introduces false attacks, i.e., ones that do not work
in the original model, but this has not happened in the analysis of this protocol.
The following discussion will allow us to sketch the main ideas behind our
HLPSL specification, and as a concrete example, we will give an excerpt of our
specification in the next subsection.
We begin by discussing two preliminary simplifications that are already incor-
porated in the original model (as compared to a real system) and that therefore
cannot be part of our formal argumentation. These two simplification have to
do with concrete timing and time-outs, which are not part of our model. For
the first preliminary simplification, consider a protocol that prescribes that an
agent should wait a certain amount of time for a particular message and if that
message doesn’t arrive within this amount of time, then it shall continue with a
special “time-out part” of the protocol, e.g., resending a request or aborting the
session. In a model without concrete timing, we can model this by an agent who
behaves as follows in the waiting state: at any point, it non-deterministically
chooses either to wait longer or to go into a time-out state. Note that this is
an over-approximation of the reality, as there is no guaranteed minimum or
maximum time to wait.
The second preliminary simplification concerns the sending a sequence of
several messages. In reality, this means that an agent sends all messages within
a short amount of time. We simply model this by sending, in a single event,
a large message composed of all single messages to be sent. This neglects the
fact that other messages may be received during a longer sequence of sending
messages. The model is justified by the fact that these received messages don’t
have an influence on the sequence of messages that are not yet sent, so it is not
a restriction to see the sending as an (atomic) event.
We now come to the model simplifications that we have have carried out in
the formalization of the protocol specification. We will now prove a number of
lemmata that we have used to argue that these simplifications are sound in the
sense that if the original model has an attack, then the simplified model also has
an attack. Note that it is not necessary to prove the completeness — i.e., that
every attack of the simplified model corresponds to an attack in the original
model — if there are no attacks in the simplified model. Note also that the
following presentation is only semi-formal as the model is not defined formally
in all detail in this paper.
Lemma 1. Message deduction by the adversary is monotonic with respect to the
adversary’s knowledge. 2
If the adversary learns a new message, then this can never decrease the set
of messages it can derive. This follows from the fact that adversary deduction
is defined as the least closure of the adversary’s knowledge under a set of de-
duction rules. This closure is clearly monotonic with respect to the adversary’s
knowledge.
Lemma 2. Strate transitions are also monotonic with respect to the adversary’s
knowledge. 2
Given a state s and a transition that is applicable to s, if we augment the
adversary knowledge in s, then the transition is still applicable. This follows
by Lemma 1 together with the fact that all transitions only refer to positive
adversary deductions, i.e., no transition requires that the adversary cannot derive
a particular message.
Lemma 3. The monotonicity also holds with respect to reachability of attack
states. 2
Given a state s from which an attack state is reachable, if we augment the
intruder knowledge in s, then the attack state is still reachable from s. This is
because the attack predicate also refers only to positive adversary deductions,
i.e., attack states remain attack states when the adversary knowledge increases.
Lemma 4. The monotonicity also holds for the secret and request facts, while
antimonotonicity holds for the witness facts. 2
If s is an attack state s, then s remains an attack state when adding request
facts and when removing witness facts from it. This follows directly from the
form of authentication goals and the fact that secrecy goals do not depend on
witness and request facts.
The next lemma tells us that it is not a restriction to take certain transitions
as soon as possible:
Lemma 5. If r is a transition rule r such that
– r does not change the local state of the respective agent (which implies that
this transition can be done any number of times with different input mes-
sages),
– the RHS of r does not generate any witness facts,
then it is not a restriction to apply rule r whenever applicable. 2
The change of the global state caused by such a transition consists of an augmen-
tation of the adversary’s knowledge (by the outgoing message) and, potentially,
some request or secret facts are generated. The additional facts and the increased
adversary knowledge can only increase the set of reachable attack states, as
shown by the previous lemmata.
Similarly, it is not a restriction to completely remove certain transitions from
the model:
Lemma 6. If r is a transition rule r such that
– r does not change the local state of an agent,
– for any incoming message (known to the adversary), the resulting outgoing
message is already known to the adversary, and
– no goal facts are created,
then it is not a restriction to never take r, and we can thus safely remove this
transition from the model. 2
Clearly, the adversary itself can perform the functionality from ingoing to out-
going message. As the rest of the state is not changed, it is not a restriction to
rely on the adversary to perform such a step itself (when it needs it to mount
an attack).
Simplifying the Client We can now simplify the client as described in the
following 3 steps.
1. As we observed above in the informal argumentation about concrete timing,
we model the client in such a way that it sends all 5. PayloadMessage in
one transition — as soon as it has received the 4. CreateSequenceResponse
message.
2. The client can neglect any requests of step 5.1. NotAcknowledged from the
service to retransmit messages, since the Dolev-Yao adversary has seen all
5. PayloadMessage and can thus replay them to the service if this is neces-
sary for an attack (by Lemma 6). Hence, we can consider a simplified client
program that, having sent all its payload messages, simply waits for ac-
knowledgment messages (6. SequenceAcknowledgment) or, after timing out,
requests acknowledgment from the service (5.1∗. AckRequested).
3. According to our modeling of time-outs, the client can non-deterministically
send 5.1∗. AckRequested messages at any time. The respective transition does
not change the local state of the client, and we can thus take this transition
as soon as possible (by Lemma 5). Intuitively, one can imagine that the
adversary can intercept all responses from the service to deliberately make
the client produce acknowledge-request messages.
These simplifications yield a client program that behaves as follows in every
message sending phase: it sends all payload messages together with the corre-
sponding requests for acknowledgment in one step, then waits until all messages
are acknowledged, and finally sends a 7. TerminateSequence message.
Simplifying the Service For the service, we proceed similarly:
1. The first simplification concerns the 5.1. NotAcknowledged message. When-
ever the service receives 5.1∗. AckRequested but has not yet received the
corresponding payload message, then it answers with 5.1. NotAcknowledged
to make the client send the payload message again. By the client simplifica-
tion described above, the adversary knows the respective messages of step
5.1∗. AckRequested as soon as the message exchange starts (i.e., as soon as it
knows any 5.1∗. AckRequested message). Since this transition doesn’t change
the local state of the server, we can perform this step as soon as possible (by
Lemma 5). We thus let the service generate, and send to the adversary, all
such 5.1. NotAcknowledged messages as soon as the service has received the
first 5. PayloadMessage.
2. The second simplification concerns the 6. SequenceAcknowledgment message,
which we deal with in a similar way. As soon as the service has received all
5. PayloadMessage messages up to an index i, the adversary can easily obtain
from it the 6. SequenceAcknowledgment by sending the 5.1∗. AckRequested
message (which, as remarked before, the adversary knows at this time). The
service does not change its state when sending the acknowledgement, and we
can thus simplify the service to always directly send the sequence acknowl-
edgment messages as soon as possible, i.e., as soon as all messages up to a
certain index are received (by Lemma 5).
3. The third simplification concerns the reception of 5.1∗. AckRequested mes-
sages by the service. The service can reply to such a request in two different
ways: if it has already received all the payload messages for which the ac-
knowledgement is required, then it will send a 6. SequenceAcknowledgment
message; otherwise, it will send a 5.1. NotAcknowledged message for all pay-
load messages it has not yet received. However, all these possible reply mes-
sages by the service are already known to the adversary by the first and sec-
ond simplification above, and again the processing of an 5.1∗. AckRequested
message does not change the state of the service. Thus, the service does not
need to process such 5.1∗. AckRequested messages (by Lemma 6).
B.3 HLPSL Specification
As we remarked above, thanks to the expressivity of HLPSL, we have been
able to formalize a complete, generic HLPSL-specification of the Secure WS-
ReliableMessaging Scenario parameterized over the number of messages ex-
changed. Such a specification is, however, too complex for automated analysis
and we have thus devised the simplifications described in the previous subsec-
tion. By applying these simplifications to our generic HLPSL specification, we
have obtained a specification which has some of these parameters as hard-wired
constants of the description. In particular, we have unrolled several loops and
compressed them into a single transition, e.g. that the client sends out all payload
messages in one transition.
The resulting specification is over 10 pages long and we thus only briefly
discuss an excerpt here (formal details about HLPSL, which we will not describe
here, can be found in [10, 36]). Figure 7 shows one transition of the client role.
This transition can fire when the client’s state variable State is 2, which is
the case when it has sent out a 3. CreateSequence message and is waiting for a
4. CreateSequenceResponse. The pattern of this expected message is described
in the Rcv predicate: all those variables that are primed are learned during this
transition (and any value is acceptable in these positions) while all unprimed
variables represent values determined already in previous steps. (Note that all
identifiers that start with a lower-case letter are constants.)
If the preconditions are satisfied, the client can start sending payload mes-
sages (according to the 5. PayloadMessage format), but, as explained above,
in our simplified model, the client will now send out all his payload mes-
sages at once, together with all possible requests for acknowledgment of the
3. State = 2 /\
Rcv(ID4’.C.csr.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.{{ID1.S.rst.C.{rst.S.N}_K.
{C.PkeC.PksC}_inv(PksCA)}_inv(PksC)}_SK2.
{mac(SK1.ID4’.C.csr.ID3.csr.IDSeq’)}_SK2.csr.IDSeq’)
=|>
State’=3 /\
Snd(ID5_one’.S.ping.IDSeq’.one.IDsk.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID5_one’.S.ping.IDSeq’.one.
{ping.Msg_one’}_SK2)}_SK2.{ping.Msg_one’}_SK2) /\
Snd(ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.one.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.one)}_SK2) /\
Snd(ID5_two’.S.ping.IDSeq’.two.IDsk.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID5_two’.S.ping.IDSeq’.two.
{ping.Msg_two’}_SK2)}_SK2.{ping.Msg_two’}_SK2) /\
Snd(ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.two.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.two)}_SK2) /\
Snd(ID5_three’.S.ping.IDSeq’.three.IDsk.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID5_three’.S.ping.IDSeq’.three.
{ping.Msg_three’}_SK2)}_SK2.{ping.Msg_three’}_SK2) /\
Snd(ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.three.IDsk.N2.IDsk.N1.
{mac(SK1.ID51star’.C.ar.IDSeq’.three)}_SK2)
request(C,S,n1,N1) /\ request(C,S,n2,N2) /\
witness(C,S,one,Msg_one’) /\ secret(Msg_one’,{C,S}) /\
witness(C,S,two,Msg_two’) /\ secret(Msg_two’,{C,S}) /\
witness(C,S,three,Msg_three’) /\ secret(Msg_three’,{C,S})
Fig. 7. An excerpt of the HLPSL specification: a transition of the client role.
5.1 ∗ .AckRequested format. Since, in our analysis settings, we have limited the
number of payload messages to 3, the client sends out 6 messages in this tran-
sition (the Snd predicates). Note that primed variables like Msg_one’ on the
right-hand side of the transition that did not appear on the left-hand side and
that are not part of an equation (like State’=3) represent freshly generated
values that the adversary cannot predict.5
Finally, the transition generates several predicates relevant for the security
properties. With the request predicates, the client “requires” correspondence
with the service on the nonces of the initial request-security-token exchange.
Also, for every payload message, the client “declares” his intention to use it as
5 In some applications of the Scenario, the payload messages may be (partially) pre-
dictable or at least guessable. The secrecy of payload message thus refers only to
whether the Scenario itself may reveal such values to an adversary.
the corresponding payload message and that it is supposed to be a secret shared
only with the service.
C Additional Security Properties and Refined Property
Description
In this section, we give a more precise definition of the security properties infor-
mally stated in Section 2.2. We capture these properties as follows, adapted to
the scenario:
– We treat no message alteration and authentication together as the fol-
lowing property message integrity : Let an honest service S accept a
5. PayloadMessage with the parameters m (in body5), IDSeq , and n, and
let C be the client identity seen by the service in this session. Then if C is
honest, it sent a 5. PayloadMessage with parameters m, IDSeq , and n.
– No message disclosure is slightly refined as follows in the symbolic ver-
sion: Let an honest client send a 5. PayloadMessage with the parameter
m, and let S denote the service identity as seen by the client in this ses-
sion. Then if S is honest, only S learns m, assuming C and S do not reuse
m.Cryptographically, we have to restrict this by allowing the adversary to
learn the length of m, while we can relax the precondition on non-reuse of
m, see Section 4.
– Key integrity and confidentiality are to some extent auxiliary properties used
to show the preceding properties. We refine them as follows: If an honest
client derives a key sk in Step 3 and sees S as the service identity, and if S
is honest, then S has derived the same key in Step 2 of a local session. If an
honest server derives a key sk in Step 2 and sees C as the client identity, if C is
honest, and if S then accepts a CreateSequenceResponse in the same session,
then C has derived the same key in Step 3 of a local session. Furthermore,
in both cases, symbolically no other party learns the key. Cryptographically,
the key is indistinguishable from a random value at the time Step 2 has been
finished.
The following properties are not explicitly required by the standard but they
are useful as well:
– Message freshness: If a service accepts a message as defined under message
integrity, then the client sent the corresponding message not before the ser-
vice sent its CreateSequenceResponse message.
– Key freshness for client : If a client derives sk in Step 3, then the service
started the session in which it derived sk not before Step 1 of the client’s
session.
– Correct Confirmation: If a client receives a message that confirms receipt of
a message by an honest service, the service has indeed received this message.
– Liveness: If an honest client sends a message to an honest service, and if the
underlying network guarantees that all messages are eventually delivered,
then the client will eventually receive a confirmation of the receipt of the
message by the service.
– Successful session termination: If an honest client and an honest service
successfully terminated a session, both will no longer use the shared session
keys sk1 and sk2.
– Successful cancellation of master key : If an honest client and an honest ser-
vice successfully canceled the validity of the key sk , both will no longer use
the shared key sk .
D Postponed Proofs
This section contains the proof of Theorem 1.
D.1 Existing Results on Nesting Encryption and Authentication
The security of the scenario crucially relies on a specific combination of public-
key encryption and signatures in the key-exchange phase (respectively, the use
of hybrid encryption with signatures), and specific combinations of symmetric
encryption and authentication in the message-sending and termination phase.
Before we start with the actual proof of security, we briefly review existing
security results for these combinations.
The key-exchange phase relies on a sign-then-encrypt construct Enc(Sig(·)),
if we ignore the hybrid encryption for the moment. It has been shown by An
et al. that the sign-then-encrypt construct guarantees authenticity and secrecy
of the contained message if the encryption and signature schemes satisfy the
security definitions we outlined above, and if the respective public keys have
been exchanged in an authenticated manner [67].
In the message-sending and the termination phase, each message contains
an authenticate-then-encrypt construct Symenc(Mac(·)); the 5. PayloadMessage
furthermore contains an encrypt-then-authenticate construct Mac(SymEnc(·)),
since body5 = SymEnc(PM,m) is contained in the MAC. Both combinations
have been extensively studied in the literature, in particular since they constitute
crucial parts of SSL and IPSec. In particular, Krawczyk has shown that under
the security definitions we pointed out before, the encrypt-then-authenticate
construct guarantees both authenticity and secrecy of the contained message,
and that the authenticate-then-encrypt approach guarantees the authenticity of
the contained message [68].6 The results rely on the assumption that both parties
share secret encryption and authentication keys which are indistinguishable from
randomly chosen keys given the view of the adversary.
6 It was also shown there that secrecy is not guaranteed in the authenticate-then-
encrypt construct in general, but that secrecy can be achieved if the construct ad-
ditionally satisfies the definition of integrity of ciphertexts; this is the case for, e.g.,
a standard MAC combined with CBC based on an arbitrary block cipher.
D.2 Analysis of the Key-Exchange Phase
Cryptographic Secrecy and Integrity of the Nonces N and N∗ after
Step 2 We first show that in an execution between an honest client and an
honest service, the nonces N and N∗ exchanged in Step 1 and 2 of the protocol
are cryptographically secure immediately after Step 2, i.e., they are authenti-
cally distributed between C and S and indistinguishable from random bitstrings
of the same length, given the view of an arbitrary cryptographic attacker. In
the following, we assume that all nonces be of a length nonce len, which is a
polynomial in the security parameter k.
The security of the nonces essentially follows since we have a hybrid encryp-
tion of signatures with a fresh symmetric key in Step 1 and Step 2, combined
with the results of Section D.1. More precisely, instead of standard hybrid en-
cryption where each symmetric key is used for exactly one encryption, we have
a construct EncX(k),SymEnck(m
′
1), . . . ,SymEnck(m
′
t) for a constant t. Security
nevertheless holds under our assumptions: k is indistinguishable from a random
key given EncX(k), and symmetric encryption with random keys is known to be
secure for multiple encryptions. Hence we can safely replace the hybrid encryp-
tion with public-key encryptions Enc′X(m′1), . . . ,Enc
′
X(m
′
t), where Enc
′ denotes
another secure public-key encryption scheme.
We now apply this transformation to the first two steps of the key-exchange
phase. Next we exploit the results on the sign-then-encrypt construct, cf. Sec-
tion D.1. The certificates CertC and CertS ensure that the respective public
keys are exchanged in an authenticated manner, under our assumption that the
public key of the certification authority is authentically distributed to C and
S. Now we can deduce that the nonces N and N∗ are authentically exchanged
in Step 1 and 2 since they are contained in a sign-then-encrypt construct with
correctly distributed public keys. The additional occurrence of N in SigConf
and body1 and of N
∗ in body2, which are not contained in an sign-then-encrypt
construct, are no problem for authenticity since they only impose additional
tests upon message parsing. To establish the secrecy of N and N∗, note that
the sign-then-encrypt construct guarantees that N and N∗ remain cryptograph-
ically secret in header1 and header2. However, N and N
∗ occur as well in body1
and body2 (and in SigConf , but there only as body1 again),respectively, so that
we have to show that no information about N and N∗ leaks from these body
elements. This however is an easy consequence of the IND-CCA2 security of the
public-key encryption system as it particularly ensures secrecy if the same key
is used polynomially many times.
Secrecy and Integrity of the Key sk after Step 2 Although we now know
that the pair of N and N∗ has been authentically exchanged and that it is
indistinguishable from a pair of random bitstrings of the same length, we cannot
conclude in general that sk := Hash(N,N∗) is indistinguishable from a random
bitstring of the same length if we only make normal cryptographic assumptions
about the hash function.7 An easy way to show the desired randomness would
be to work in the random oracle model and to treat the hash function as a
random oracle. However, that would introduce a non-justifiable idealization [69].
Fortunately, we do not need that, but can remain in the standard model of
cryptography: We only require that the hash function, when applied to pairs,
be a pseudo-random function in its first argument.We define that a key sk ψ for
the pseudorandom functions is chosen as a random string of length nonce len(k)
and that the pseudorandom function works on messages of length nonce len(k)
and, given a key sk ψ and a message m, outputs r := Hash(m, sk ψ).
The definition of a pseudo-random function is that an adversary without ac-
cess to sk ψ, but given certain pairwise different messages m1, . . . ,mn, cannot
distinguish the sequence of outputs ri := Hash(mi, sk ψ) of this function from a
series of random values. In our case, sk ψ, being the nonce N∗, is not completely
random and secret. However, given the indistinguishability result of Section D.2,
standard cryptographic arguments show that the pseudo-randomness of the val-
ues ri still holds with N
∗ as the key, if no other information becomes known
about N∗ later. Indeed the nonce N∗ is never reused in Steps 3-9 or outside this
protocol.
The integrity of sk follows directly from that of N and N∗ because it is the
same deterministic function of them for both parties.
D.3 Analysis of the Payload-Sending Phase and the Termination
Phase
A similar derivation process as for sk is made for the keys ski = Hash(Ni, sk)
for i = 1, 2, where the same sk may be used for multiple such derivations, each
time with new nonces N1 and N2. In the following, let Keys(sk) denote the set
of key-pairs (sk1, sk2) that C has derived from sk . Let further Keys(sk)[1] and
Keys(sk)[2] denote the set of authentication keys and the set of encryption keys
contained in Keys(sk), respectively. As we have shown that sk is indistinguish-
able from a random value after Steps 1 and 2, and as sk is not used in Steps
3-9 except in these derivations, the same arguments as in Section D.2 show that
each (sk1, sk2) ∈ Keys(sk) is indistinguishable from a pair of random values of
this length for the adversary.
Authenticity of these keys is not so easy to show as the client only sends the
nonces Ni in the unprotected message part Session. Assume that an adversary
replaces one or both of them by a different value N∗i . Then the service obtains
a corresponding key sk∗i that is indistinguishable from a random value for the
adversary (by the same argument as for the correct nonce Ni). We first show
that if sk∗1 6∈ Keys(sk)[1] or if sk∗2 6∈ Keys(sk)[2] the probability is negligible
that decrypting header3 containing IDsk with key sk
∗
2 and testing the validity
of the resulting plaintext with key sk∗1 succeeds for the service.
7 As an example, let Hash denote a hash function that is one-way and collision-free
for a concrete strong variant, and define Hash∗(m) := 2 ·Hash(m). It is easy to show
that Hash∗ is secure iff Hash is secure but the hashes are always even and hence
distinguishable from randomly chosen elements of the same length.
If sk∗1 6∈ Keys(sk)[1] then this would immediately contradict the security of
the symmetric authentication scheme, which can be shown by an easy reduction
where the new adversary on the pure authentication key chooses its own key sk∗1.
If sk∗2 6∈ Keys(sk)[2] we construct an adversary A∗ against the pure encryption
scheme. It constructs a message µ as C would do in Step 3 and computes a MAC
of µ with a random key sk1. It hands this MAC and an equally long string of
zeros to the encryption oracle as two messages that it tries to distinguish. When
the encryption oracle returns a ciphertext c of either the MAC or the zeroes,
then A∗ decrypts c with a random key sk2. If the resulting plaintext pi is a correct
MAC for µ, then A∗ decides that the MAC was decrypted. One can easily see
that pi is a correct MAC in this scenario with random keys with essentially the
same probability as in the attack by A if the encryption oracle encrypted the
MAC. In contrast, if it were a correct MAC with not negligible probability if the
encryption oracle encrypted the zeroes, one could again break the MACs. Hence
this leads to a not negligible distinguishing probability for A∗.
Now assume that an honest service S accepts a 5. PayloadMessage with the
parameters m (in body5), IDSeq , and n, and let C be the client identity seen by
the service in this session. We have shown in the previous step thatm was authen-
ticated using a key sk∗1 and encrypted with a key sk
∗
2 such that sk
∗
1 ∈ Keys(sk)[1]
and sk∗2 ∈ Keys(sk)[2]. Since IDSeq has been freshly generated by the service af-
ter Step 3 and since sk∗1 is unknown to the adversary, we conclude that this MAC
must have been newly created by either C or S; otherwise, we could perform a
reduction against the message authentication scheme again. Since the service S
does not create messages of the format of 5. PayloadMessage, this message must
have been created by C and hence after C’s completion of Step 4. The encryption
was performed with the unique key sk ′2 that satisfies (sk
∗
1, sk
′
2) ∈ Keys(sk). We
finally show that sk ′2 = sk
∗
2, i.e., if the message of Step 5 was generated using the
key sk ′2 for a message m, then using the key sk
∗
2 instead must not give a mes-
sage m′, i.e., we have to have SymEncsk ′2(PM,m) = SymEncsk∗2 (PM,m
′) and at
the same time SymEncsk ′2(Macsk
∗
1
(ID5, S,PM, (IDseq , n),SymEncsk ′2(PM,m))) =
SymEncsk∗2 (Macsk
∗
1
(ID5, S,PM, (IDseq , n),SymEncsk∗2 (PM,m
′)) under the as-
sumption that IDseq is fresh. This means that two independent random encryp-
tion keys behave identically on large parts of the plaintext unchanged, which
gives rise to a straightforward reduction against the security of the encryption
scheme: The adversary gives the encryption oracle a message (PM,m) and an
equally long string of zeroes. It then decrypts the obtained ciphertext with a
random key sk∗2. If the resulting plaintext pi is of the form (PM,m
′) for some
m′, then the adversary decides that the first message was encrypted. Similar to
the above proof, one can easily see that pi is of this format with essentially the
same probability as in the attack by A which hence leads to a not negligible
distinguishing probability for the adversary attacking the encryption scheme.
For authentication, note that body5 is contained within an authenticate-then-
encrypt construct. This guarantees the authenticity of body5 and hence ofm since
we already showed that the keys sk1 and sk2 are shared secretly and authentically
between C and S. The additional occurrence of m in body5 outside of header5 is
no problem for authenticity since it only imposes additional tests upon message
parsing.
For the secrecy of m, we cannot simply argue in the same way
since the authenticate-then-encrypt construct does not necessarily guaran-
tee secrecy. However, there is a nested encrypt-then-authenticate construct
in header5, since body5 is contained in the MAC. Although this does
not precisely match the standard construct Mac(SymEnc(·)) but looks like
Mac(ID3, S,PM, (IDSeq , n),SymEnc(·)), it is easy to see that this does not vi-
olate the secrecy guarantee for the encrypted message as long as it does not
additionally occur in the MAC outside the encryption.Hence the message m
contained in header5 is secret. We finally have to consider body5, which contains
m and which is transmitted outside of header5. We have shown that sk2 is secret
from the adversary. Hence the secrecy of m follows from the security definition
of symmetric encryption.
We do not formally address the optional properties of message and key fresh-
ness, correct confirmation, and liveness as defined in Appendix C, but they are
easily derivable from the proofs above or follow exactly the same proof pattern,
respectively.
